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This research study evaluates the ability of the Naval Simulation System (NSS) to 
model how changes in communication architecture for a given scenario contribute to 
combat effectiveness.   The scenario used for this study models communication capability 
associated with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Sea Viking 06 distributed operations 
scenario using the NSS.  In addition, an evaluation of alternative system configurations in 
the communication structure is obtained in order to determine how bandwidth constraints 
on specific systems limit mission effectiveness.  The NSS is a multi-warfare mission area 
tool designed to support operational commanders in developing and analyzing 
operational courses of action at the group/force level.  Recent evolutionary changes now 
provide the NSS the ability to perform communication analysis of routed and circuit 
switched systems in addition to course of action analysis of modifiable assets in a 
programmed scenario. This capability makes the NSS unique among modeling and 
simulation tools. 
The simulation model experiment contains seven communication architectures 
with progressively reduced bandwidth capacity.  Each architecture excursion has the 
same scenario timeline and measurement parameters.  The results of each excursion are 
graphically compared and statistically analyzed to identify communication performance 
impacts at critical events throughout the scenario.  A correlation is made with 
communication performance and combat effectiveness when the enemy force attrition is 
compared over each excursion to identify if a decrease in combat effectiveness can be 
seen as a result of reduced communication capability.  The results show that the NSS can 
be used appropriately and accurately to represent communication system effectiveness 
within a distributed operation scenario supported by the ESG. 
The objective of this study directly supports the Network Centric Operations 
(NCO) framework at the information domain by demonstrating the ability of the NSS to 
measure quality of a communication plan and its value within a command and control 
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The movement toward network-centric operations (NCO) by the U.S. Armed 
forces has increased the need for communication systems that support emerging warfare 
concepts.  In NCO, networked Joint Forces increase operational effectiveness by 
facilitating a dispersed force to move effectively, communicate, share common 
operational pictures and achieve the desired end state with minimal losses [OFT05].   The 
Navy and Marine Corps team have developed the FORCEnet operational construct and 
architectural framework as their path toward NCO.  FORCEnet will guide the integration 
of sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force that is able to change based on the operational environment.  It 
is the naval command and control (C2) component for Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary 
Warfare [NNWC06].  The Navy and Marine Corps have committed to FORCEnet as the 
architectural framework of the future, and are evolving their communications 
architectures in that direction. 
To further articulate the FORCEnet vision, a capabilities document, 
commissioned by Naval Network Warfare Command and signed off by the Chief of 
Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, outlines a functional 
concept to establish a common direction for development of desired FORCEnet 
capabilities.  Two of the 15 required capabilities describe a need for automated decision 
aids to simulate outcomes of possible courses of action and to rapidly incorporate new 
technology without disrupting the system [NNWC06].  To support these capabilities, a 
complete modeling and simulation (M&S) environment is required, both to provide 
course of action analysis and to provide technology integration testing to demonstrate 
warfare effectiveness in the network centric environment. 
No single M&S solution exists that can support both warfare commanders and 
acquisition community decision making through incorporation of current communication 
technologies for the evaluation of both course of action and communication system 
alternatives with respect to combat power.  Highly capable decision aids and analysis 
2 
tools are available that evaluate combat effectiveness and communication system 
performance separately.  Common combat models such as THUNDER, JWARS and the 
early versions Naval Simulation System (NSS) proved useful as course of action analysis 
tools but lacked the ability to model communication system impacts.  NETWARS, 
currently under development by SPAWAR, demonstrates military communication system 
performance, but lacks the ability to assess impacts to warfare effectiveness 
[Alspaugh04].  Newer versions of these tools have incorporated higher level architectures 
that allow federation between models.  
The NSS is an object-oriented, Monte Carlo modeling and simulation tool under 
development by SPAWAR and Metron, Inc. for CNO N6M.  NSS is a multi-warfare 
mission area tool designed to support operational commanders in developing and 
analyzing operational courses of action at the group/force level.  Its initial attempt to 
simulate robust C4I entities and organizations makes it unique among M&S tools.  In 
addition to course of action analysis, recent evolutionary changes to the NSS 
communication modeling algorithm provide the ability to perform in-depth analysis of 
routed and circuit switched communication systems in a programmed scenario.  This 
thesis exercises these features using an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) scenario.  This 
scenario provides an operationally relevant and unique opportunity to study 
communication system effects on combat effectiveness. 
In addition to an interest in modeling communication systems in the NSS, the 
author is bound for an amphibious flagship, and wants to advance his knowledge in the 
communication architectures and challenges in the littoral combat environment.  Also, 
these ships are currently deploying as ESG flagships, so he desires to expand knowledge 
to include ESG operations and related challenges.  These factors motivated an 
experimental design that exercised the routed communications capability of NSS to 
assess possible communications architectures for ESG operations. 
B. PROBLEM 
This research first examines the utility of the NSS for modeling communications 
systems with the new routed communication module.  To assess the utility of the NSS, 
simulated components of an ESG with associated communication systems were crafted in 
the NSS, and then tested in scenario excursions.  These tests were then used to determine 
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whether the NSS environment and the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) available within 
the NSS database would be sensitive enough to support comparison of communication 
system alternatives.  Having met these objectives, the capstone of this research was to 
utilize the combat model aspects of the NSS, combined with attrition type MOEs in the 
NSS, to connect communication architecture performance to overall combat 
effectiveness.  Specifically, the thesis addresses the following three questions:  
 1.   With the new routed communications feature for modeling communication 
systems, is the NSS the right tool for course of action analysis in a net-centric 
environment? 
 
 2. Does the NSS have the ability to generate data that will reflect changes in 
communication system performance due to changes in the communications 
architecture? 
 
 3.  Does the NSS have the ability to reflect the impact of communication system 
performance on force effectiveness? 
 
To address these questions, we will conduct an evaluation with NSS using 
different communication configurations, focusing first on a careful analysis of the 
simulated combat effectiveness observed across different communication architectures.  
We will then examine these combat effectiveness results for correlating data within 
communication performance data to further illuminate any differences.  Our assessment 
of the utility of NSS will be based on a subjective evaluation of our experimental design, 
execution and analysis. 
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II History, presents the historical evolution of NSS and its past use.  In 
addition, we introduce alternate modeling solutions for comparison. 
Chapter III Architecture & Analysis Method, explains the tactical scenario 
applied in the model and the NSS model development procedure, including details of the 
communication model parameters.  The Distributed Operations concept and model 
analysis measures are presented, to include a description of lessons learned while 
building the model.  Also, a description of the changes applied to the communication 
model and the specific analysis measures used to evaluate the model are given. 
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Chapter IV Results, describes the analysis strategy and provides a graphical and 
statistical presentation of the results. 
Chapter V Conclusions and Recommendations, provides conclusions from the 
analysis and gives recommendations for future work. 
Appendix A, details the Distributed Operations scenario and timeline. 
Appendix B, lists the comprehensive communication MOEs available to evaluate 
the NSS model. 






























Possible communication system modeling and simulation environments are 
presented in this chapter, to include a history of the NSS program. 
B. THE NAVAL SIMULATION SYSTEM 
1. Overview 
The Naval Simulation System (NSS) is an object-oriented Monte Carlo modeling 
and simulation tool that provides a comprehensive multi-force modeling and simulation 
capability [Stevens00].  The NSS models surface, subsurface, air, ground, and space 
assets with their associated weapons, sensors, and C4I systems in coordination with user 
specified warfare commander’s orders.  The NSS is capable of representing C4I, 
logistics, force engagements and commander’s tactics simultaneously throughout the 
multi-warfare simulation.  The NSS currently supports a number of Naval theater 
operations such as: Naval and Joint operation planning and decision support, C4I analysis 
and assessment, Fleet exercises and experiments, and Fleet training.  The software is 
written mostly in C++ and runs over networked computers in a client-server or stand 
alone configuration under Microsoft Windows operating system.  The NSS version used 
for this experiment is v.3.3.3 build 14. 
The NSS models the interaction of various force assets, based on initial plans and 
the dynamic reaction of commanders.  Dynamic command decisions in the NSS are based 
upon a generated, perceived tactical picture, not the ground truth position of targets.  The 
tactical picture is generated from the inputs of customizable organic and remote sensors.  
Warfare Commanders dynamically respond to this perceived tactical picture based on 
tactics tables and the availability of resources [Stevens03].   
To facilitate scenario development, the NSS Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
provides a five step scenario creation process.  Force alliances, command structures and 
associated assets are assigned to warfare commanders.  Initial command and control 
plans and response tactics are defined for each commander.  Motion plans, 
communication networks, sensor schedules and any logistics plans are defined. Mission 
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plans for surveillance and reconnaissance assets and strike aircraft are defined.  Finally, 
over 100 predefined and user modifiable analysis measures can be generated.  A fully 
defined, classified and unclassified, modifiable baseline asset database is included with 
the proprietary commercial off-the-shelf NSS data dictionary. 
 
Figure 1.   NSS Functional Segments (From [Stevens03]) 
 
For analysis, the NSS is capable of generating data on a variety of pre-
programmed and user definable performance measures. The output spreadsheets provide 
individual and replication averaged, time based MOE values for post processing analysis 
and graphical display through an export utility directly to Microsoft Excel. 
2. History 
In 1995, under Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) guidance, 
each of the military branches initiated efforts to exploit emerging technologies in object 
oriented software development and computing power to develop higher resolution 
simulation systems.  The goal was to achieve faster, more detailed analysis and training 
avenues for regional commanders on current war plans. 
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DARPA entered into a large effort to produce a Synthetic Theater of War 
(STOW) capability using high-speed computing to achieve sufficiently detailed 
representations of key warfighting platforms to provide realistic training for Joint Forces 
[Hout03].  In 1995 the DoD Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) initiated a major 
simulation system interoperability effort.  An Architecture Management Group (AMG) 
was formed to define and prototype a new architecture to provide a general means of 
achieving interoperability between different simulation system software [Hout03].  The 
High Level Architecture (HLA) standard was developed to fulfill this initiative of model 
interoperability.  The NSS became a major part of the DMSO Architecture Management 
Group initiative as the Navy’s representative system, along with other Service’s training 
and analysis modeling software systems. 
During 1995, Space & Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Command PMW-153 
and Metron Inc. jointly developed NSS for Chief of Naval Operations, C2 Systems 
Division and established the NSS Program Office.  Throughout the development phase, 
the NSS was employed in numerous operational fleet exercises and Fleet Battle 
Experiments (FBE).  With its emphasis on C2 evaluation, the NSS was first tapped to 
support the FBE series in the role of scenario stimulator for C2 systems.  NSS was 
modified to generate OTHT-Gold contact reports that were fed to C2 systems being 
evaluated in FBE-B.  A single replication of the Monte Carlo NSS simulation was run in 
real-time mode and the tactical picture simulated for human operators manning the C2 
system [Gagnon/Stevens99].  By 1998 the NSS was certified Global Command Control 
System (GCCS) compliant, demonstrating its potential interoperability with operational 
C4I systems.  The NSS has also proven to be a valuable warfare assessment tool.  
Fulfilling a task for the Commander, Pacific Fleet in 1998, the NSS used a Korean 
Peninsula scenario for preliminary assessment of the potential warfare benefits of the 
Navy’s IT-21 initiative. The result of that study was that distributed command would 
result in major timeline improvements in a counter-SOF mission for that theater 
[Atamian99]. 
In 2002 program sponsorship shifted from the C2 System Division to the Navy 
Modeling and Simulation Management Office (NAVMSMO).  In January 2003, the 
program executive for NSS was shifted from SPAWAR to NPS.  In October 2003, 
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NAVMSMO transferred management of the NSS program to Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) Research and Engineering Group, Warfare Analysis Center.  This 
move placed the NSS into an acquisition and management organization, with NPS as the 
independent Verification and Validation Agent (V&VA).  The NSS user community, 
consisting of leading defense contractors and naval systems commands, used the 
assessment tool to evaluate the Multimission Maritime Aircraft Project, Coast Guard 
Deepwater Project, DD-X, Littoral Combat Ship and UAV development studies.  The 
following initiatives are recent NSS projects that the Naval Postgraduate School has 
participated in: 
• N81 Net Assessment – Net Assessment of the Navy’s current and future 
warfighting capabilities.  The capabilities based assessment looked at 
previous warfighting capabilities analyzed against new focused programs 
in all warfare areas.  The Information Dominance assessment team 
assessed the optimal mix of networked Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and sensors that would increase a warfare 
commander’s situational awareness [Levitt04].  The net assessment used 
two modeling programs NSPAT and NSS to determine ISR sensor mix 
and the impact on simulated campaign outcome.  The use of NSS provided 
a comprehensive assessment to analyze all warfare areas on the campaign 
level including explicit C4I capabilities.  Results of the NSS analysis 
revealed bottlenecks in communication paths, network nodes and limits in 
data collection capabilities that may exceed current Naval asset capacity 
[Levitt04]. 
• World Class Modeling Initiative – The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
MOVES Institute developed this initiative, sponsored by OPNAV N81.  It 
successfully fulfilled the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) 
Analytical Agenda to transform the way the DoD applies Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) to the challenges of today’s warfighters [MOVES04].  
To support this initiative, required M&S capabilities were developed that 
allow the move away from monolithic, closed system designs, to open 
M&S frameworks that permit modular, loosely coupled components to be 
rapidly integrated to create agile analytical capabilities to address a variety 
of missions conducted in asymmetric warfare [MOVES04].  Recent 
advances in the Extensible Modeling and Simulation Framework (XMSF) 
program allow the exploitation of Internet technologies and the ability to 
meet the DoD M&S requirements that deal with analysis, training, 
acquisition, and experimentation.  Internet technologies, including 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) based languages and service 
oriented architectures, will enable a new generation of distributed M&S 
applications to be developed. 
9 
Objectives of the World Class Modeling Initiative are to [MOVES04]: 
• Develop a framework and proof of principle demonstration of the 
use of Web based technologies to interface the NSS and Combined 
Arms Analysis Tool for the 21st Century (COMBATXXI) via Web 
services and the NPS SimKit API. 
• Develop a visual user interface for creation of event graph 
representations of discrete event simulation components. 
• Design and conduct demonstrations of the analysis capabilities of 
the hybrid NSS/COMBATXXI environment. 
• Enhance the NPS Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection planning tool. 
 
C. NETWARS 
The Network Warfare Simulation (NETWARS) is a modeling and simulation tool 
that assists military planners to construct a computer representation of a communication 
network structure.  It is under development by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA).  The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 
San Diego (SSC SD) is the Navy representative for NETWARS related efforts, which 
include Architecture and Standards, Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) 
contributions, model development and assessments [Alspaugh04] 
The NETWARS computer model is applied to a geographical or relational map 
and used to simulate the operational dynamics of message flow through the simulated 
strategic, operational, and tactical military voice and data network structures.  The model 
inputs are based on user inputted traffic density.  Simulation model communication 
behavior can be provided down to the packet and protocol level.  NETWARS analyzes 
the results of a simulation session and produces a set of Measures of Performance (MOP) 
in graphical form.  The measures allow configuration decisions that effect resource and 
bandwidth management that can be applied to communication plans drafted as part of the 
Joint Planning Process [Opnet04]. 
Although NETWARS has proved a capable tool for communication systems 
modeling, for this study NSS was the better choice to meet our objectives.  NETWARS is 
currently unable to directly evaluate command and control systems effectiveness in terms 
of a warfare commander’s force effectiveness.  Further, NETWARS simulates message 
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capacity by predefined Information Exchange Requirements (IER).  These parameters 
specify message traffic capacity over time; thus, NETWARS can be used to identify 
network design deficiencies by exercising the simulated communication system at the 
upper-limit or worst case.  Within NSS, the message traffic varies based on the way the 
simulated combat scenario unfolds.  This event-triggered message generation within NSS 
provides the crucial link connecting communications system performance to combat 
power. 
D. SUMMARY 
Previous studies with the NSS conclude that the modeling tool is well suited for 
detailed campaign level warfare assessments.   This study incorporates the routed 
communication feature to assess C4I system modeling impact analysis on combat 
effectiveness.  With a valid scenario, command and control organization, communication 
plan and experiment metrics, a simulation model will give acceptable results to analyze.  
The building blocks and experiment design of the simulation model for analysis of 
communication alternative impacts will be discussed in Chapter III. 
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III. ARCHITECTURE & ANALYSIS METHOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the process used to build and analyze the simulation model 
in the NSS.  First, a tactical scenario is selected based on the warfare area being studied.  
Second, a command and control structure is determined for tactical decisions, which then 
drives the design of the communication structure, which is articulated in a 
communication plan.  Next, measures of effectiveness (MOE) are selected which will 
determine the attributes or characteristics of interest to the analysis.  Finally, the model is 




The methods chosen to answer the three thesis questions are briefly described 
below in reverse order for ease of understanding. It was decided to answer the third 
question (assessing the NSS ability to reflect the impact of communication system 
performance on force effectiveness) objectively, based on one or more measures of force 
effectiveness (MOFE). The second question (assessing the NSS ability to generate data 
that will reflect changes in communication system performance due to changes in the 
communications architecture) would be answered by visually comparing graphical 
presentation of time traces of selected communication system measures of effectiveness 
(MOE) across the scenario, and if differences in force effectiveness were detected 
(question three above), the time traces would be examined to see if they could be used as 
diagnostic aids to determine if the communication system impacted force effectiveness. 
Finally, the first question (assessing the usability of NSS for course of action analysis in a 
net-centric environment, with the new routed communications feature for modeling 
communication systems) would be answered subjectively, based on the author’s 
experience during the model development and analysis effort. 
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Prior experiments using the NSS as an analysis tool provided insight into the 
capabilities of the modeling program.  Examining the scenario requirements for these 
analyses and reviewing the NSS documentation provided insights into the command and 
control elements to needed to create realistic communication architectures that included 
current technology.  These previous studies also revealed measurement avenues that 
could be applied to communication system architectures, we also examined alternative 
modeling tools, such as NETWARS. 
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) was used as a 
guide to develop an analysis structure to examine the NSS model’s ability to produce 
useful results about the effectiveness of basic C4I system alternatives.  Quantitative and 
qualitative C4I measures of effectiveness (MOEs) developed thorough the Modular 
Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) were broken down into specific 
physical parameters that were then programmed into the NSS. 
Once the overall experimental construct was established, (a single tactical 
scenario and several communications architectures – see Scenario Selection below) the 
next steps were to select the tactical scenario and then develop several alternate 
communications architectures that, coupled with the scenario would provide data to 
answer the thesis questions.  It was decided to construct variants of the communication 
architecture that progressively constrain the bandwidth of selected networks, and 
therefore were expected to impact both communication system performance and 
warfighting effectiveness.  
To obtain communication system performance data, several NSS communication 
system MOEs were identified, modified and assigned to gather data from the 
communication model to determine if they adequately reflect the communication system 
changes. One NSS attrition MOE was also selected to determine if changes in 
communication architecture led to changes in warfighting effectiveness. 
Seven communication plans (a baseline and six alternatives with progressively 
reduced bandwidth) were each combined with the fixed tactical scenario and then 
programmed as separate excursions of the model. The model was then executed seven 
times for each excursion and values of the communication system and attrition MOEs 
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were collected for each run.  The attrition MOE values were compared statistically to test 
differences on force effectiveness and time traces of the communication system MOEs 
were graphically compared, both to visualize any effect of reduced bandwidth on 
communication system effectiveness and to assess whether observable changes in 
communication performance clearly correlated with changes in combat performance.  
Finally, the author’s experience in preparing for and conducting the analysis was used to 
assess usability of the NSS. 
C. SCENARIO SELECTION 
To keep the study simple yet effective, the initial concept for scenario design was 
to take a three-tiered approach to model development.  The first tier would be a limited 
objective, time and force scenario implementing Special Operations Forces (SOF) from 
amphibious platforms, in a maritime environment, executing intelligence gathering and 
destruction of a static threat.  The second tier would involve more maritime forces in a 
littoral environment executing a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) of a local fishing 
vessel.  The last tier would build on the prior two scenarios, using a single 
communication architecture.  This larger scale scenario would entail a Non-combat 
Evacuation Operation (NEO) of civilians from a port city.  This military operation would 
involve a larger force complement such as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to 
include air support and more specialized infantry platoons.  The experiment would have 
focused on analysis of the impact on force effectiveness of an anticipated increase in 
communication load due to increased force size and mix and increased operational 
complexity. 
It became evident that the tiered scenario concept would not fully support the 
stated goals of the thesis for several reasons.  Most important, it lacked the experimental 
control needed to properly examine the effect of alternate communications architectures 
on force effectiveness. It was then decided that a single expeditionary warfare scenario, 
coupled with changes in the communication architecture, would better accomplish the 
experimental objectives.  Specifically, this would enable a study of changes in force 
effectiveness due to alternate communication architectures. 
At this point, research into the specifics of an appropriate was undertaken.  To 
reduce the time required to program the scenario into the NSS, and to provide credibility, 
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it was hoped that a previously employed NSS model could be located that involved or 
could be converted to involve expeditionary warfare, and could also be programmed to 
utilize the new routed communication feature.  With these goals in mind, a search was 
conducted of existing NSS scenarios.  No existing NSS scenario that met these 
requirements was uncovered, so the author began looking for non-NSS scenarios that 
could be modeled in NSS to meet the requirements. 
This led to the scenario that the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory developed 
for the Distributed Operations Seminar Wargame conducted in 2004 in preparation for 
the Sea Viking 06 Warfighting Experiment.  This scenario deploys a Distributed 
Operations (DO) Platoon to conduct reconnaissance of suspect terrorist activity, using 
remote sensors and direct infiltration, in preparation for possible air strikes.  The DO 
Platoon is supported by an amphibious ready group (ARG) as part of an ESG deployment 
to assist in the security needs of an allied coastal nation.  The decision was made to 
develop several NSS models of the DO mission, each incorporating routed 
communications architectures of progressively decreasing bandwidth. 
D. TACTICAL SCENARIO DESIGN 
1. Background 
Through the Sea Viking 2006 experimental campaign plan, the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is tasked to develop requirements to support the 
additive capability of a Distributed Operations (DO) capable platoon.  Toward that goal, 
a scenario based on the evolving Distributed Operations concept was developed and used 
in  DO Seminar Wargame number one, conducted in November 2004 [MCWL04]. The 
tactical scenario developed for the thesis is based on the MCWL DO scenario, and was 
developed with assistance from MCWL. 
2. Distributed Operations 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps charged the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command to explore transformation options that are in-line with future 
force employment requirements.  The requirements rise from the need to counter a 
different type of globally distributed adversary, one who is ruthless, unpredictable, and 
adaptive.  On the premise that Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) employ Marine 
forces, a collaborative experimentation effort  between one rifle platoon from a selected 
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Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) and the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is underway to craft tactics, techniques and procedures 
(TTPs) through the Sea Viking Experimentation Program.  The next iteration of the Sea 
Viking Experiment will entail live-force experimentation with Distributed Operations 
(DO) as its key component.  This concept-based experiment is fulfilled by Sea Viking 06. 
The intent of DO is to provide a relevant, additional capability that capitalizes on 
new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and leverages advanced technologies, 
particularly those that are communications related [Wilson04]. 
The DO concept works to leverage improvements achieved through FORCEnet.  
DO describes an evolving concept that seeks to maximize the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) commander’s ability to employ tactical units across the depth and 
breadth of a nonlinear battlespace, in order to achieve favorable intelligence-driven 
engagements as part of the Joint Force Commander’s overall campaign [Goulding05]. 
The DO concept, as defined by MCWL, envisions a specially trained and 
equipped rifle platoon from the ground combat element (GCE) of a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU).  This enhanced platoon provides the Marine Expeditionary Unit Special 
Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) commander, a specialized capability to locate, close 
with and destroy the enemy through enhanced day/night observation equipment, 
patrolling skills, vehicle mobility, improved rifleman communication suite, crew-served 
weapons, and an ability to provide terminal guidance for joint fires [Wilson04].  The 
notional platoon is built around three 13-man squads with enhanced equipment and a 5-
man command element consisting of a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, guide, radio 
operator and corpsman.   
Wargames conducted to provide direction to MCWL in the development of the 
DO concept have identified critical capabilities of the DO platoon that differ from current 
rifle platoon capabilities.  Some findings are that DO squads must be able to collect, 
transmit and receive actionable intelligence.  This capability will require additional 
training in surveillance and reconnaissance patrolling and procedures for logistical 
support requirements [Wilson04]. Other conclusions of particular interest are the need for 
the DO unit to provide positive identification and likely intent of enemy units.  This 
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capability is of particular importance when implementing rules of engagement in support 
of Global War on Terrorism.  The Marine Corps hopes to find solutions to these critical 
capability shortfalls through future concept development, technology innovation and 
experimentation. 
E. DO COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE 
In this study the command and control (C2) operational structure is based on the 
ESG structure used in west coast deployments where the Amphibious Squadron 
(PHIBRON) Commodore acting as Amphibious Warfare Commander and Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Commander acting as Expeditionary Warfare and Landing 
Force Commander share a supporting-supported relationship.  The supported Commander 
gives direction, but does not specify particular assets to achieve the desired end state.  
Figure 4 shows the Navy ESG Commander and Marine Deputy Commander having a 
joint role as Strike Warfare Commander.  As an added capability to the Rifle Company in 
the Ground Combat Element, a Distributed Operations mission commander would 
provide contact and situation reports on designated MEU voice or data communication 
circuits to the Ground Combat Element Commander directing the mission from a 
Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) onboard the MEU command ship, which 
is represented by the LHA in this scenario.  In a typical ESG, the Landing Force 
Operations Center (LFOC) is the C4I coordination hub, consolidating reports from the 




Figure 2.   ESG Operational C2 Structure (After [Hutchins05]) 
 
 
F. TACTICAL SCENARIO 
The storyboard and scenario details are included in Appendix A.  They were used 
as an object movement timeline reference and a communication load and delay analysis 
reference to significant events in the scenario.  
G. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM MODEL DESIGN 
An ESG communication system plan was drafted that incorporated the 
communication systems in use throughout the scenario.  The communication architecture 
model in this study (Appendix D) follows the command and control structure in Figure 2.  
Communication nodes are designated at the appropriate warfare commander asset with 
circuits in a typical ESG communication plan, connecting all scenario assets.  The Strike 
Warfare Commander on the LHA receives contact reports and track updates from all 
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assets, and has the ability to issue tactical orders to the DO Platoon Commander and air 
assets through multiple terrestrial and satellite communication networks.  The DO 
Platoon Commander, deployed with the DO platoon, receives and relays contact and 
track reports from the supporting squads and unmanned sensors and issues movement 
orders to the squads through line of sight communications. 
1. Communication System Description 
a. Introduction 
The primary communication devices used in the scenario are described in 
the following paragraphs.  These systems are used to provide decision support and 
command and control avenues to the MEU Commander.  Friendly and enemy force 
location data is entered into the tactical systems and passed to other display and 
processing systems by the data links described below. 
b. Iridium Network 
Iridium satellite service provides global voice and data connectivity 
through the use of a 66-satellite low earth orbit constellation.  Commercial customers 
connect to other Iridium satellite telephones using the cross-linked network and to the 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) through a gateway located in Tempe, AZ.  
Government customers use the dedicated Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services (EMSS) to 
connect in a similar manner to the Defense Information Services Network (DISN) 
through a similar gateway in Hawaii providing secure capable service to the Defense 
Switch Network (DSN), the commercial and international long-distance network, the 
NIPRNET and the SIPRNET.  The EMSS gateway provides 2.4 kilobits to 9.6 kilobits 
per second voice and data connectivity and supports NSA Type-1 encryption when 
required. [Ellen03].  EMSS service is offered through the Defense Information System 
Agency to DoD, other Federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, 
and Joint Staff approved foreign and allied government users. [DISA05]. 
c. Expeditionary Tactical Communications System (ETCS) 
ETCS is a prototype netted radio system that uses the Enhanced Mobile 
Satellite Service (EMSS) on the commercial Iridium constellation.  The system 
requirements are to provide on the move (OTM) and over the horizon (OTH) 
communication capability from seabased command and control centers to dismounted 
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tactical maneuver units operating in complex terrain ashore with a minimum ground 
infrastructure.  The system has the capability to transmit voice and data messages and is 
integrated with current Marine Corps C2 systems such as the Command and Control 
Personal Computer (C2PC) application running on the Data Automated Communication 
Terminal (DACT) and Commander’s Digital Assistant devices.  The effectiveness of 
ETCS as a viable tactical communication backbone circuit was evaluated during MCWL 
Sea Viking 06 Advanced Warfighting Experiment [MCWL05]. 
General Dynamics C4 Systems is developing the networked radio system 
that enables users to share a single channel for voice and data communication in a talk 
group or one-to-many(broadcast) configuration.  This system is more efficient than the 
traditional cellular one-to-one configuration, and uses a push to talk connection with a 
short setup time.  This automatic multiple access configuration forces users to an idle 
channel pool so others have access to the same network enabling bandwidth management 
[Paldan04]. 
The use of EMSS voice and data communication meets USMC over-the-
horizon and on-the-move operational requirements of tactical units in Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare [Paldan04].  Iridium equipment configured to use talk groups can 
connect distributed, inter-theater assets and extend these assets to wired government 
network users through the DoD EMSS gateway.  The Marine Corps and General 
Dynamics tested this enhanced capability in the ETCS configuration shown in Figure 1 to 
include data nets, position location information (PLI) and blue force tracking (BFT) 
during the MCWL Sea Viking 06 Experiment [Paldan04]. 
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Figure 3.   ETCS Sea Viking 2006 Configuration (From [GeneralDynamics04]) 
 
d. Link 11/16 Tactical Data Links 
Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) A/B [Link-11] employs data 
network communication techniques and a standard message format to exchange digital 
information among airborne [TADIL-A] as well as land-based and shipboard [TADIL-B] 
tactical data systems. Link 11 provides high speed computer-to-computer digital radio 
communications in the high frequency (HF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) bands 
among Tactical Data System (TDS) equipped ships, aircraft and shore sites 
[GlobalSecurity.org05].  Link 16 is the primary real-time tactical data link for the 
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exchange of TADIL-J messages.  It is used to support C2, navigation and identification 
for tactical military operations providing secure, jam-resistant digital communications 
over UHF bands.  These data links provide the raw data to combat systems such as the 
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Advanced Combat Direction 
System (ACDS).  This data is distributed to GCCS-M where it provides a global 
operating picture to the warfighter. 
e. Global Command Control System Maritime (GCCS-M) 
Global Command Control System Maritime (GCCS-M) is the naval 
variant of GCCS; it was formerly the Joint Maritime Command Information System 
(JMCIS). The system establishes and presents a fused, real-time common operational 
picture of the battlespace to the warfighter for all automated C2 functions used for 
situational awareness and decision making.  These C2 functions include: track 
management sharing between Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS); Command 
and Control Personal Computer (C2PC); and Theater Battle Management and Core 
System (TBMCS); imagery and video management and sharing between Joint Service 
Imagery Processing System (JSIPS), Image Product Library (IPL) and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) data, targeting processes between Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 
System (AFATDS), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS).  It 
provides a single, integrated, scalable C2 system to receive, correlate, fuse, and maintain 
geo-located track information on friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and integrates that 
information with intelligence and environmental information. GCCS-M also provides the 
joint operational planning and execution capabilities to plan, deploy, employ, and sustain 
armed forces. The system provides warfare commanders a single integrated workstation 
for generating, receiving and sharing secure C2 information.  GCCS-M has been installed 
on all amphibious warships [NADPGR02]. 
2. Distributed Operations Communication Plan 
The scenario requires point to point and multipoint communication paths between 
programmed assets in the model.  The two DO Squads are aware of sensor data by line of 
sight radio circuits.  This sensor data, as well as own asset location information is relayed 
through the platoon commander to the warfare commander on the LHA.  The platoon 
commander passes this data using the ETCS terminal over the Iridium network.  He also 
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receives orders from the warfare commander through a satellite communication 
(SATCOM) circuit.  Both of these communication paths have secondary SATCOM and 
over-the-horizon HF circuits programmed for redundancy.  The platoon commander 
passes these orders to the Squads for execution through line-of-sight UHF voice circuits.  
All data is fused with Link 11 and 16 data from organic aircraft and ESG sensors 
reporting own assets and each other throughout the scenario.  All track data is presented 
to the warfare commander on a common picture by GCCS-M. 
a. Researched Architecture 
A baseline communication structure was formed from research into 
shipboard communication networks and C4I systems unique to a typical ESG.  It was 
collected from multiple sources including Standing Naval Communication plans located 
in Naval Tactical Publication-4, Naval Warfare Publication-4.  Typical bandwidth 
allocation for each circuit was obtained from research into each specific network and was 
helpful to determine communication node characteristics for each voice and data circuit. 
Circuits selected to model in the NSS represent those necessary for 
mission accomplishment.  Redundant secondary circuits were created for designated 
forces to use in the scenario.  Appendix D shows a Communication Node Connectivity 
Description of the communication architecture modeled in this simulation. 
H. NSS MODEL ARCHITECTURE DESIGN 
1. NSS Object Database 
The NSS unclassified Object Store is used to create the scenario specific Instance 
Archive database of default object templates that are used in the scenario.  User defined 
objects are created from the object templates and individual object characteristics are 
defined based on scenario needs.  Object characteristics include attached sensors, 
vulnerabilities, movement speed and attached communication terminals and nodes.  The 
list of all objects available for use in the scenario is stored in the Instance Library shown 
in Figure 4, below.  Communication nodes, applicable sensors and movement parameters 
are programmed on each object, and then each is assigned to an alliance.  For the purpose 
of this model, red and blue alliance forces are programmed to interact throughout the 




Figure 4.   NSS Database Manager Mode 
 
2. Communication Model Development 
a. NSS Communication Model 
The following discussion describes the communication plan representation 
by a routed communication plan spreadsheet and can be omitted on first reading.  All 
terms and programming procedures are detailed in the NSS v3.3 Analyst Guide 
[Stevens02]. 
(1) Terminals and Nodes.  Link Terminals and Network Nodes 
are built onto each object that communicates within its alliance.  Each network 
connection to an object requires a dedicated Link Terminal and Network Node.  There 
cannot be a Terminal or Node with the same name on the same object, but there can be 
multiple Terminals and Nodes with the same name associated with the same network on 
different objects.  Customized transmission delay, using minimum and maximum delay 
or transmission rate and message size, is available for each Link Terminal connection.  
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There are three types of Network Nodes, Radio Transceivers, IP Communications, and 
Point-to-Point Nodes.  Radio Transceivers are instantaneous transmission nodes where all 
bandwidth of the network is used for simplex communication and no collisions occur.  
The specification of frequency bands for each node looks to be a future implementation 
and is not available on this version of the NSS program.  IP Communication nodes have 
no attributes.  IP network bandwidth attributes are applied in the routed communications 
input spreadsheet.  Point-to-Point nodes require a specified number of simultaneous 
transmissions, similar to a telephone network. 
(2) Routed Communication Plan.  The NSS model design 
utilizes the Terminals and Nodes to implement a routed communication plan.  The routed 
communication input file is a tabbed Excel spreadsheet.  Each of the seven tabs define a 
different segment of the input plan for a specified alliance. 
Address Groups designate collective address names for groups of 
individual asset objects that can be used anywhere the name of an object is required.  
Address Groups are used in the communication plan tab when the group of assets defines 
a network segment destination.   
The Network tab defines each communication link between 
objects with a unique name and network type.  Network types are either IP Network, 
Broadcast or Point to Point.  An IP Network is used for links that will have simultaneous 
transmissions dependant on a defined bandwidth in bits per hour.  A Broadcast network 
allows simplex communication, one message at a time and all members of the network 
receive all transmissions.  A Point-to-Point network is designated to simulate a telephone 
link where one transmitter object is connected to one receiver object with a defined 
number of messages allowed at one time.  Equipment compatibility is not used in this 
model; it defines an equipment type label for the network.  Sender Aware of Connection 
Success is used in Point-to-Point networks.  Band is not used in this model; it defines the 
network frequency band being simulated. 
CCP tab assigns the Terminal and Node objects previously defined 
for each object on to a defined network.  Each terminal and node can only be assigned 
once per asset. 
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Message Template tab is where a unique name, type, size, 
preparation and transmission delay and message priority can be defined for each message 
detection type.  Message types consist of Contacts, which are raw sensor messages, 
Tracks, which are fused contact data, General, that are command and control messages, 
and Ack, that are General or Track message receipt acknowledgements. 
The Message Group tab assigns message template types into 
groups that can be used in the communication plan. 
The Comms Plan tab defines specific routing for message types.  
A Comms Plan Element (CPE) is created for each route a message takes from originator 
thru any relays to each segment destination.  There are four types of CPEs; Track or 
Contact reports caused by an asset tactic, Track or Contact reports caused by a warfare 
commander tactic, command and control (C2) messages caused by a commander tactic, 
and C2 messages for a commanded asset.  Acknowledgments are required for C2 
messages for a commanded asset.  A Qualifying Destination must be filled in signifying 
the ultimate receiving asset for all CPE except for contact track reports that are caused by 
asset tactics.  A route is one or more uniquely named element(s) of the CPE having a 
designated precedence, and acknowledgment details dependent on message type.  
Additional routes in a CPE can be used for simulated redundant circuits carrying the 
same message type.  There can be one or more Segment Networks for each route.  The 
Segment Network is the name of the network for the route segment terminated or relayed 
to another segment through the Segment Destination.  Designate a Terminal if the 
message will be relayed from the destination to another CPE having an alternate 
destination, enabling each destination to process a local track from the contact report.  
This relay method is not source routed and requires the relay CPE have an intermediate 
sender listed.  IP Latency tab defines the amount of time an IP message takes between 
land and surface asset types.  The default latency is 20ms that is typical for wired 
networks.  In this model, 110ms is used for land and surface connections, and 220ms is 
used for satellite relay connections.   
The Network Parameters tab defines additional background 
traffic, any denial of service degradation of a single IP network, and operational picture 
corruption.  Each parameter is required for to complete the communication plan.  These 
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parameters would introduce additional that was above the scope of this experiment.  
Track Update rate tab defines a specified rate per hour that track updates occur for 
stationary assets according to asset type.  In this model, all stationary assets with sensors 
update detected tracks every 15 minutes. 
3. Blue Force Tracking Objects  
A Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system is a critical command and control element 
to employment of combat forces.  The common force tracking application employed by 
the MEU uses C2PC over a line-of-sight wideband UHF data network or the Iridium 
satellite network.  The maritime example in this scenario employs the ESG assets feeding 
GCCS-M tracks over line-of-site UHF Link 11 circuits.  These BFT element examples 
are created for this simulation model. 
For each blue alliance asset created there is a mirror BFT object with attached 
magnetic sensor that detects the parent object magnetic vulnerability and a 
communication terminal and node that transmits the BFT sensor detections, contact and 
track reports instantaneously to the parents object.  The blue alliance asset relays this 
track information through the respective Position Location Indicator (PLI) system, for 
ground forces or Link 11 network for maritime forces.  The LHA receives the contact and 
track reports and then transmits the reports to each of the other units for a common 
operational picture of friendly force information and locations.  Measurement of this 
network insures that the physical links associated with each object are of sufficient 
bandwidth to handle the capacity demands placed on them by the BFT system. 
4. Unmanned Ground Sensor Objects 
To conduct covert missions, Special Operations Forces have identified a need for 
unmanned ground acoustic and infrared sensors.  These sensors have the ability to detect 
and image objects that move within their specified detection range.  The data that is 
collected by each sensor is transmitted to a nearby observer through a VHF data network.  
The contact data can be entered into a tracking system and the imagery data can be 
transmitted to a regional intelligence center for processing. 
In this scenario model, there are three sensors, one acoustic and two infrared 
imagery sensors, which are used to detect and identify targets in the red alliance camp 
and on the roads.  The Back from Patrol (BFP) Ground Acoustic Sensor 01 is used to 
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send a large amount of imagery data to LHA at a specified time after the compound raid 
on the suspect training camp.  The need to differentiate between large and small message 
sizes is necessary to obtain a way to increase or decrease message load through the sensor 
data paths.  We accomplish this by programming different types of sensors that produce 
message of different size and increase or decrease the number of sensor detections 
throughout the scenario. 
I. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT LESSONS LEARNED 
This section details lessons learned while crafting the NSS scenarios for this 
experiment.  Future investigators may find these helpful when extending this research. 
1.  When making objects, check instances for fusion centers so assets are able to 
relay sensor detections as contact reports and also have the ability to create local tracks. 
Also, check Red alliance instances for damageable components for battle damage 
assessment determination. 
2.  Assign a Warfare Commander to the Platoon Commander asset so 
maneuvering squads can be assigned identification and engagement orders directly from 
the field units instead of from Strike Warfare Commander attached to LHA. 
3.  To keep BFT sensors in close proximity to the parent asset, create a formation 
movement plan for maritime instances.  Formation movement plans are unavailable for 
land objects.  To alleviate this limitation, BFT objects associated with each asset have 
identical movement plans.  Although, when the platoon commander orders squads for 
identification and track and trail tactics, a squad will move away from the planned patrol 
areas simulating covert action and will not update their respective track while assigned to 
intercept unidentified tracks. 
4.  Assign a Platoon Commander tactic to relay all local tracks for track updates 
that go to all assets during the terminal air strike operation.  This allows increased 
probability of kill of Red forces by AV8 Harrier.  To also increase probability for Red 
 kills the minimum and maximum movement speed for each asset assigned to an area, 
needs to decrease so Blue forces can engage Red targets for a successful track and trail 
tactic. 
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J. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS MEASURES 
Selection of effectiveness measures is an essential step in performance analysis of 
any C4I system.  This analysis is used to identify improvement alternatives in the system 
design.  It is recognized that a single definition of performance measures does not exist, 
and the determination of both performance and effectiveness of C4I systems has proven 
to be a complex problem.   
This thesis will focus on measures of system performance related to 
communication system message load characteristics, and behavior such as, timeliness or 
accuracy.  To provide the means for analysis of force effectiveness, as the scenario 
progresses Red alliance attrition will be measured and related to system performance 
measures to identify any correlation with the scenario timeline.  To gather these 
performance and attrition measures, relevant predefined MOEs are selected from existing 
database in the NSS program and programmed to specific asset characteristics. 
1. NSS Configurable MOEs 
Short descriptions of available measures that relate to communication networks 
are provided in Appendix B.  Each measure has receiver, sender, asset and sampling 
conditions, or breakdown lists, which can be selected and modified dependent upon the 
communication plan definition for each asset.  Multiple measures can be assigned to each 
communication link, applied with different measurement conditions. 
2. Applied NSS Measures 
A predefined set of attrition MOEs is used to determine the effectiveness of force 
applied when a track and trail tactic is assigned to air assets for target updates.  The 
remaining MOE types are user defined and determine message loading and delay on each 
network in the communication plan.  Each of the MOEs is based on the number of 
messages sent and received at a specific Terminal attached to an object.  One MOE 
counts the total of all messages sent and received throughout the scenario.  BFT messages 
sent and received are counted in a separate MOE to enable troubleshooting of possible 
communication network anomalies.  Communication message loading determines the 
time average number of messages at a specified object or associated terminal and is only 
used for IP networks.  This MOE is used for the IP network and Iridium network in the 
model. 
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Figure 5 summarizes the NSS MOEs used in the model to analyze communication 
loading, delay and attrition associated with the network names pictured in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 5.   NSS MoE Summary 
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K. EXPERIMENT EXECUTION 
1. Analysis Process 
The NSS employs a Study Management mode to execute the specified number of 
Monte Carlo simulation replications and automatically collect desired MOEs for export 
to formatted Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  The MOE data is exported in two types of 
files, an average summary and individual MOE output for each run.  Average values are 
calculated for each MOE and summarized in one file, while the other file contains each 
individual MOE value generated per a programmer specified sampling rate for that MOE. 
The scenario design dictates that data from multiple excursions with 
communication architecture changes be used in the experiment.  By only changing the 
communication architectures, excursion analysis allows for increased control of the 
experiment.  To exercise the Monte Carlo approach afforded by NSS each excursion is 
executed seven times with different random number seeds.  The same seven seeds are 
used for each excursion.  Also, MOEs for each excursion stays the same throughout the 
study. 
We design seven different communication plan excursions, a baseline plan and six 
alternatives, to determine if changes in communication performance occur.  Each 
excursion differs from the others only in the amount of bandwidth allowed for the 
circuits.  To focus the experiment we will analyze only Sent Messages and Message 
Receipt Delay MOEs on the circuits used by the DO command structure.  This allows a 
comparison of network communication load and message receipt delay during critical 
events in the scenario. 
The primary communication links being analyzed for communication load are the 
Iridium network, passing Blue Force Track (BFT) messages, and MEU TAC SATCOM 
circuit with contact and track reports being passed from the deployed Platoon 
Commander.  Message Receipt Delay measurement looks at all networks that carry 
contact and track reports from unmanned sensors and squads through the Platoon 
Commander for relay to the Strike Warfare Commander on the LHA. 
2. Baseline Communication Plan 
The baseline plan includes all networks and circuits in the communication model.  
The bandwidth of the Iridium IP network is set at 24K bits per second (bps).  The 
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bandwidths of the broadcast networks are all set at a default 1.5Mbps as shown below in 
Table 1.  This gives the communication plan an overall bandwidth greater than 7Mbps for 
all message types.  With this open bandwidth scheme, we assume that all messages 
generated by the sensors and all orders from warfare commander assets will be received 
at their final destinations in a minimal amount of time. 
 
Network Name Asset Terminal Name Terminal Bandwidth (bps)
MEU TAC HF HF Radio Term1 1.5M 
UHF Link 11 Link 11 Term 1.5M 
UHF Intersquad UHF Term1 1.5M 
SCC C&R UHF Term2 1.5M 
MEU TAC UHF Satcom Term1 1.5M 
MEU CMD UHF Satcom Term2 1.5M 
VHF Intersquad VHF Term1 1.5M 
Table 1. Baseline Bandwidth Settings 
 
3. Limited Iridium 
The Limited Iridium excursion includes all networks in the communication 
model.  The only deviation from the Baseline is the bandwidth of the Iridium IP network 
is now constrained at 6Kbps.  The bandwidths of the broadcast networks are all still at the 
default setting of 1.5Mbps.  This also gives the communication plan an overall bandwidth 
for all message types at greater than 7Mbps.  With this bandwidth scheme, we investigate 
if a constrained IP network sending BFT messages over the Iridium network effect 
communication MOEs. 
4. Limited Iridium Wideband 
The Limited Iridium Wideband case includes all networks in the communication 
model.  The bandwidth of the Iridium IP network is constrained at 6Kbps.  The 
bandwidths of the broadcast networks assigned to Blue Force Tracking and unmanned 
sensor circuits are at the default setting, but all other primary broadcast communication 





Network Name Asset Terminal Name Terminal Bandwidth (bps)
MEU TAC HF HF Radio Term1 2.8K 
UHF Link 11 Link 11 Term 6.0K 
UHF Intersquad UHF Term1 6.0K 
SCC C&R UHF Term2 6.0K 
MEU TAC UHF Satcom Term1 25K 
MEU CMD UHF Satcom Term2 25K 
VHF Intersquad VHF Term1 30K 
Table 2. Limited Iridium Wideband Case Bandwidth 
 
These bandwidth changes are applied at the network terminals for each asset 
connected to that network.  This case gives the communication architecture an overall 
bandwidth for all message types at 79Kbps.  With this bandwidth scheme, we investigate 
if constrained contact and track reports over the broadcast radio networks, as well as 
messages over the Iridium network effect communication MOEs, and if this 
communication limitation affects Red alliance attrition. 
5.  Limited Iridium Narrowband 
The Limited Iridium Narrowband excursion is similar to the previous wideband 
case except the primary broadcast network bandwidths of MEU TAC, MEU CMD and 
VHF Intersquad are continually constrained as shown below in Table 2. 
 
Network Name Asset Terminal Name Terminal Bandwidth (bps)
MEU TAC HF HF Radio Term1 2.8K 
UHF Link 11 Link 11 Term 6.0K 
UHF Intersquad UHF Term1 6.0K 
SCC C&R UHF Term2 6.0K 
MEU TAC UHF Satcom Term1 6.0K 
MEU CMD UHF Satcom Term2 6.0K 
VHF Intersquad VHF Term1 16K 
Table 3. Limited Iridium Narrowband Case Bandwidth 
 
This case gives the communication architecture an overall bandwidth for all 
message types at 46Kbps.  With this bandwidth scheme, we continue to decrease 
bandwidth while keeping the same message volume during each simulation excursion. 
6.  No Iridium 
In this case, we remove the Iridium network from the communication model, 
simulating a drop in satellite connectivity.  The bandwidths of the broadcast networks are 
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all again at the default setting of 1.5Mbps.  This again gives the communication plan an 
overall bandwidth for all message types at greater than 7Mbps.  To continue to provide an 
alternate communication path for contact and track reports, we configure the MEU TAC 
HF network as a secondary circuit to the MEU TAC Satcom link for these message types.  
With this configuration, we are investigating if the removal of the Iridium network effects 
communication MOEs. 
7.  No Iridium Wideband 
In this case, we also remove the Iridium network from the communication model.  
The bandwidths of the broadcast networks are the same as in the Limited Iridium 
Wideband case.  The primary broadcast network bandwidths are constrained as shown in 
Table 2 above.  This case gives the communication architecture an overall bandwidth for 
all message types of 76Kbps.  This scheme continues to decrease bandwidth with the 
removal of the Iridium network and the limitation of the MEU TAC HF radio circuit.  
With this bandwidth constraint, we are investigating if contact and track reports over only 
the broadcast radio networks effect communication MOEs, and if this communication 
limitation affects Red alliance attrition. 
8.  No Iridium Narrowband 
In this final case, we also remove the Iridium network from the communication 
model.  The bandwidths of the broadcast networks are the same as in the Limited Iridium 
Narrowband case.  The primary broadcast network bandwidths are constrained as shown 
in Table 3 above.  This case gives the communication architecture an overall bandwidth 
for all message types of 43Kbps.  This scheme continues to decrease bandwidth with the 
removal of the Iridium network and the significant limitation of the MEU TAC HF radio 
link.  With this final bandwidth constraint, we continue to investigate the effects of 







Communication Architecture Overall System Bandwidth 
Baseline 7524Kbps 
Limited Iridium 7506Kbps 
Limited Iridium – Wideband Terminals  79.0Kbps 
Limited Iridium – Narrowband Terminals  46.0Kbps 
No Iridium 9000Kbps 
No Iridium – Wideband Terminals  75.8Kbps 
No Iridium – Narrowband Terminals 42.8Kbps 
Table 4. Summary Table of Alternate Cases 
 
L. SUMMARY 
The above sections describe how the NSS model was designed and built to 
execute the experiment based on a scenario utilizing the DO concept and ESG command 
and control structure.  During the development, many programming challenges were 
identified and the model was molded to reduce these limitations and remain within the 
bounds of the study.  The detailed analysis plan identifies performance measures used to 
compare seven excursions with decreasing bandwidth constraints.  The next chapter 




A.   INTRODUCTION 
We present the results in this chapter by answering the three thesis questions 
through graphical observation amplified by statistical testing of an attrition data sample.  
To identify any differences in attrition, message delay, and message load, each model 
excursion is compared to the baseline while being related the to scenario timeline.  If 
differences in attrition between excursions are realized, we investigate if they can be 
attributed to communication delays and message load.  The last step is to correlate the 
findings with the problem statements to form conclusions that will be covered in the next 
chapter. 
With NSS in study mode, we use initial runs of the scenario for troubleshooting 
problems associated with the simulation’s communication plan elements.  Then, with the 
communication plan and asset terminal errors corrected, we obtain the production runs 
from each communication architecture excursion.  The cases are characterized by 
progressively constrained bandwidth within the communication plan as described in 
Chapter III.  Each case has ten independent Red alliance targets to ensure that sufficient 
MOE data is collected to highlight any measurable results.  We compare average MOE 
data from each case graphically to determine similarities and significant differences.  We 
then match larger differences with the simulation scenario events to determine tactical 
significance of the bandwidth limited case modifications. 
B. COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE IMPACT ON FORCE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
1.  Overview 
The NSS study management mode generates the average attrition MOE data as 
the number of targets destroyed over a specified sample time.  For the scenario crafted for 
this study, up to ten enemy targets could be destroyed.  Useful attrition data is only 
collected during the air strike phase of the scenario.  Although the alternate hypothesis is 
that at least one excursion (communications architecture) would produce markedly 
different force attrition, our intuition was that there may be a somewhat linear 
relationship such that as bandwidth decreased, so would force attrition. 
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2. Experimental Results 
 
Figure 6.   Cumulative Average Attrition – 100 Replications 
 
The graph shows an ability of the NSS to identify the lack of attrition due to 
incomplete mission success after the initial sortie of strike aircraft.  The aircraft are 
programmed to loiter until their ordnance is exhausted or until fuel becomes low.  While 
loitering, the aircraft can continue to affect damage when track updates are received from 
the Strike Commander or DO Platoon Commander.  When the aircraft recover and refuel 
they are available for tasking again by the Strike Commander with updated Red alliance 
track information.  With updated position data strike aircraft will continue the attrition of 
Red tracks until recalled at the end of the scenario. 
The bandwidth limited excursions show a decrease in cumulative attrition, 
primarily between the narrowband cases where the bandwidth was most restrictive.  The 
data also shows no significant difference between wideband cases and the remaining 
excursions.  An analysis of the end-state attrition data will prove at least one of the 
excursions is different, showing changes in force effectiveness. 
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3. Analysis 
To determine the significance of our observed differences among different 
architectures, we conducted an analysis of variance between excursions’ end-state 
attrition observations.  Our working (null) hypothesis is that all seven architectures 
produce end-state data with the same mean attrition.  Our alternate hypothesis is that at 
least one communication architecture excursion demonstrates significantly different 
attrition.  ANOVA results in Table 5 clearly support rejecting the null hypothesis, with 
the No Iridium Narrowband clearly showing significantly different end-state attrition.   
Source  DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Factor   6  154.00  25.67  18.59  0.000 
Error   42   58.00   1.38 
Total   48  212.00 
 




Level                   N   Mean  StDev 
Base Line               7  8.714  1.113 
LTD Iridium             7  8.714  1.113 
LTD Iridium Wideband    7  9.429  0.787 
LTD Iridium Narrowband  7  9.429  0.787 
No Iridium              7  9.286  1.113 
No Iridium Wideband     7  9.286  0.756 
No Iridium Narrowband   7  4.143  2.035 
 
                        
 Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev 
 
Level                   ----+---------+---------+---------+----- 
Base Line                                      (----*---) 
LTD Iridium                                    (----*---) 
LTD Iridium Wideband                               (---*----) 
LTD Iridium Narrowband                             (---*----) 
No Iridium                                        (---*----) 
No Iridium Wideband                               (---*----) 
No Iridium Narrowband   (----*---) 
                        ----+---------+---------+---------+----- 
                          4.0       6.0       8.0      10.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.175 
 




Although we were able to reject the null hypothesis, the covariance between 
bandwidth and force attrition was not very strong.  The observed attrition results did not 
decrease linearly with decreasing bandwidth.  Although the No Iridium Narrowband 
excursion (an extremely low throughput case) demonstrated significantly weaker force 
attrition, all other cases were statistically identical in mean attrition.  These architectures, 
with throughputs ranging from 42.8 Kbps to over 7000 Kbps (Table 4), show a relatively 
flat response in force attrition.   
The weakness of the relation between throughput and attrition may be due to a 
number of reasons.  First, the communication plans crafted for this research and 
incorporated into NSS may have lacked sufficient detail (e.g., background traffic) to 
physically recreate realistic communications loading.  More likely, the scenario may not 
have been sensitive enough to detect small changes in throughput; a single attrition event, 
an air strike, was used in the scenario and became a single measure of all communication 
events that may have had an effect on force effectiveness within any one realization.   
Having established that we can produce meaningful changes in force attrition 
based on the communications architecture, we next investigate the communication 
performance differences among architectures in terms of message delay and message 
loading. 
C. COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE IMPACT ON 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
1. Overview 
Given the relatively poor performance of the Narrowband cases, we might expect 
that internal communications systems metrics (message delay and message loading) 
clearly correlate to the poor force attrition.  In this section, we examine these 
communications metrics with respect to each of the communications architecture 
(excursions). 
Within the scenario, we generate most of the sensor data at about the same points 
in the simulation timeline depending on Red force movement.  Command and control 
messages generated by Warfare Commanders in response to specific events depend on 
the timeliness of the sensor data as the scenario unfolds.  Across all excursions, the 
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expectation is that message delay should increase with decreasing bandwidth.  Also, as 
the tactical situation dictates more throughput at certain assets, the message delay 
between units should increase. This delay may effect overall mission effectiveness due to 
an increase in the time for Red alliance track updates to be recognized by the air strike 
assets.  The analysis of communication performance results focuses on the four cases 
where the bandwidth was constrained from the baseline. 
a. Blue Force Track Communication Load Impact 
The Blue Force Track (BFT) reports are programmed in the NSS scenario 
to update every 15 minutes on stationary targets.  Therefore, message traffic will increase 
during the sample time on the IP Network and UHF Link 11 when reporting ship 
positions at the 15 minute interval.  Minimal message delay in these networks is 
expected.  The frequency of ground force BFT reports is dependant on movement of the 
tracked asset by the BFT sensor.  Each time the asset turns, a track update message is sent 
through the position location information (PLI) and Iridium networks relayed through the 
Platoon Commander to the Warfare Commander on the LHA.  Therefore, the random 
movement generates increased message traffic through this network and when assets are 
in small maneuver areas, such as the rally area after the camp raid, an increase in BFT 
message volume is expected. 
Keeping with the stochastic nature of simulation, we expect the remaining 
networks to show random message generation within the tactical situation constraints of 
the NSS scenario.  We expect an increase in message traffic will occur after the camp 
raid when the ground units process the bandwidth intense imagery data prior to the air 
strike event.  An increase in message volume is also expected during scenario specific 
events, such as, when ground forces continuously update hostile tracks to the air strike 
assets in response to Platoon Commander track and trail orders. 
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2. Experimental Results 
a. Communication Delay 
 
 
Figure 7.   Squads to LHA - Average Message Receipt Delay (Complete Scenario) 
 
For each excursion, seven runs were made, and the average message 
delays over the two-day scenario are depicted in Figure 7.  These track and contact 
update message delays, referred to within NSS as the Total Delay at Final Destination 
MOE, are measured on the communication link between the Squads through the Platoon 
Commander relay to the LHA.  Of interest is if the MOE shows the existence of a delay 
which we can correlate with the tactical situation.  Such a situation occurs when the 
Squads and Platoon Commander send large data files to the LHA after an intelligence 
gathering raid on the suspected terrorist camp. The communication model is programmed 
to transmit these large messages in a short amount of time, but in both Wideband and 
Narrowband No Iridium architectures, this causes a significant increase in delay with a 
sharp fall-off when the last message is received eight hours later.  Note that the first three 
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cases where minimal bandwidth limitation is programmed, no message delays are 
realized on the graph.  This event appears in Figure 7 at 1:04:00. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Squads to LHA – Average Message Receipt Delay 
 
This graph represents a slice of the contact and track update message delay 
MOE.  We generate this data at the end of the scenario to emphasize the impact of 
message delay on attrition during the air strike phase.  As expected, messages in the 
Narrowband case take longer to get to their destination for action by the Strike 
Commander than in the Wideband case.  We also note that without Iridium, message 
delay increases overall due to the lack of bandwidth on the TAC HF alternate data circuit 
being used to transmit contact and track reports.  The graph also shows that some 
messages generated by sensors to update Red alliance positions do not arrive at the LHA 
by the end of the scenario to effect action by the assigned air strike. 
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b. Communication Load 
 
 
Figure 9.   Satcom MEU TAC – Average Messages Sent MoE 
 
Figure 9 represents instances of an increase in message load at tactically 
significant events from the intelligence gathering raid at 1:04:00 through the air strike at 
1:21:00 in the scenario at the limited bandwidth MEU TAC circuit between the Platoon 
Commander and the LHA.  This message load increase verifies a cause of message delay 
during the same tactical events in Figure 7.  Comparison of the two cases (Limited 
Iridium Wideband and Narrowband) can also show message receipt delay at 1:05:00 and 
1:22:00. Around these time periods there is a decrease in messages sent but the same 
number of messages in the Limited Iridium Narrowband case are required therefore it 
takes longer for the messages to get to their destination. 
3. Findings 
Our comparison of message delay among the different communications 
architectures shows a moderate relationship between the available bandwidth and delays 
(Figure 7).  These correlations are especially apparent during the air strike portion of the 
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scenario (Figure 8).  These differences are not based on simple link budgeting, however; 
further analysis of the messages sent (Figure 9) demonstrates that certain architectures 
require additional messaging to accomplish scenario objectives.  These non-linear effects 
are discernible, in part, because of the added richness in the scenario with the routed 
communications feature of NSS. 
D. UTILITY OF NSS 
1.  Overview 
As a course of action decision and analysis tool, the NSS proves its use during 
previous experimentation.  With the new routed communication modeling capability and 
associated MOEs, the expectation of the tool to demonstrate communication system 
performance metrics was high.  The possibility that this assessment of combat 
effectiveness could be attributed to these metrics was not clear due to user community 
inexperience and lack of similar studies. 
2. Findings 
Given a scenario of medium complexity (ESG) and small communications 
architecture (less than 100 nodes), we show that the NSS has the ability to demonstrate 
changes in combat effectiveness as a result of associated changes to communication 
architecture that impact communication performance.  Significant study of the NSS 
Analyst Guide and many hours of trial and error made programming the model scenario 
with routed communication capability very time intensive.  It is highly recommended that 
any further studies with the NSS utilize experienced operators for model design 
assistance. 
E.   SUMMARY 
In this analysis, we present the results by graph observations with statistical 
testing of attrition data.  We identify differences and correlate relationships between 
attrition, message delay and message load within excursions relative to the scenario.  We 
then use these results to answer the thesis questions concluding with recommendations of 
the usefulness of the modeling program.  Next, we will use this data analysis to present 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis shows the ability of the NSS to model how changes in communication 
architecture for a given scenario contribute to combat effectiveness.   The scenario used 
for this study models communication plans associated with a distributed operations 
mission from an ESG.  The simulation model experiment contains seven communication 
architectures with progressively reduced bandwidth capacity.  Each architecture 
excursion has the same scenario timeline and measurement parameters.  The results of 
each excursion are graphically compared and statistically analyzed to identify 
communication performance impacts at critical events throughout the scenario.  A 
correlation is made with communication performance and combat effectiveness when the 
enemy force attrition is compared over each excursion to identify if a decrease in combat 
effectiveness can be seen as a result of reduced communication capability. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
The examination of the results determines the answers to the questions posed in 
the thesis problem.  For ease of understanding, the findings to answer the three questions 
are summarized below in reverse order.  The average attrition data did not decrease 
linearly with decreasing bandwidth as expected.  In the most constrained bandwidth case 
there is a statistically significant difference in attrition.  Therefore, the NSS shows the 
ability to reflect the impact of communication system performance on force effectiveness. 
The visual comparison of the graphical representations of message load and 
message delay MOEs determines a moderate relationship between the communication 
architectures and the MOEs along the scenario.  By comparing the time traces it is 
evident that there exists a correlation between communication system measures of 
effectiveness and force effectiveness.  Therefore, the NSS shows the ability to generate 
data that reflects changes in communication system performance due to changes in the 
communication architecture. The NSS was successful in giving this communication 
system model a strategic focus that provided the ability to show military significance of 
bandwidth differences between communication architectures. 
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Finally, it is the author’s opinion that the NSS is a very useful tool for course of 
action analysis and to study force effectiveness impacts of sensor configurations.  To 
study force effectiveness impacts of communication system architectures, the routed 
communication capability requires significant granularity in the communication model. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis provides a general communication system evaluation procedure using 
the NSS with a medium force level (such as an ESG force model).  To fully integrate this 
modeling and simulation into FORCEnet development, future research should be 
conducted to increase communication model granularity in the NSS. 
Further communication model development should increase accuracy in 
communication throughput characteristics.  The refinement of the characteristics of 
specific network links and terminals programmed to each object will better define the 
communication plan.  The expansion of the tactical scenario to include white shipping 
traffic and the introduction of enemy ships to detect and track will also make the model 
more realistic. 
To increase the fidelity of attrition based warfighting modeling and simulation 
tools, like NSS, federation with communication modeling tools can be investigated.  
Military planners have accepted NETWARS for its ability to accurately model IP and 
broadcast networks.  This data accuracy could be federated with the NSS model to 
produce not just network specific performance measures, but also allow the NSS to 
produce strategic mission effectiveness data for the military planner to examine the 








APPENDIX A. SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
A. SCENARIO STORYBOARD 
The coastal nation of Califate has a diverse ethnic and religious pacific population 
with a major international port that has minimal vessel arrival notice and minimal 
registration requirements.  Califate has a small Coast Guard and only a ceremonial 
infantry battalion.  Local and international private security companies guard most 
government facilities and major businesses. 
The 82 square mile island province of DeLuz is home to native Califites who are 
90% Muslim.  The DeLuz Islamic Group (DIG) goal is to remove non-natives from 
Califate and establish an Islamic state.  According to CIA reports, DIG fighters have been 
trained in Afghanistan and Iraq.   Despite their small numbers DIG forces have 
performed brutal attacks killing Califate government officials. 
1. Situation 
One month ago, DIG captured and killed a US contractor working on the nuclear 
engineering project for Government of Califate Power Plant.  Ten days later, an Al Qaeda 
released video mentioned DIG as an example of the Islamic world rising to defeat the 
American, ”evil forces”.  A recent CIA assessment shows DIG has received financial and 
technical training support from major Islamic Terrorist Organizations and that DeLuz is a 
new front in Jihad.  From this assessment and from Senate Intelligence research, the 
National Command Authority determines the presence of terrorist cells in Califate a 
threat to U.S. national interests.  The President of the United States orders the creation of 
a Joint Task Force (JTF) to verify and bring those people responsible for the murder of 
innocent Califate civilians to justice. 
One week later an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with embarked Marine 
Expeditionary Unit, Distributed Operations Capable (MEU(DOC)), positions off the west 
coast of Califate, and remains outside the heavily traveled North-South shipping lanes.  
The Task Force Commander’s intent is to prepare to conduct Visit Board Search and 
Seizure (VBSS) operations with organic Destroyer, air support and Marine Special 
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Purpose Forces.  The commander also intends to prepare to reinforce security for 
Government of Califate Power Plant that is believed to be a primary DIG target. 
2. Mission 
To limit forces ashore to only those vital to mission accomplishment, the JTF 
Commander has directed a Distributed Operations (DO) mission.  This mission will 
conduct operations to confirm the presence of terrorist training activity in the DeLuz 
Island province, and attack to seize physical evidence of transnational involvement in the 
Califate region.  The mission will be conducted by a specialized DO platoon, which will 
covertly insert by Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) and distribute squads for 
observation and reporting of suspected training camp activities.  Follow-on operations for 
the DO platoon may require Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission coordination, 
direction, and terminal guidance for a precision air strike. 
3. Timeline 
For a point of time reference to simulation time, D-Day, H-Hour is the simulation 
start time.  For the scenario, it is just after sunset, two days prior to the compound strike 
on DeLuz Island.  The DO Platoon consisting of 16 men in two squads, are covertly 
delivered by two RHIBs.  The RHIBs deploy their troops and supplies and return to the 
LHA.  Squad 01 deploys to a northern vantage on DeLuz with a six-man unit, while 
Squad 02 deploys to a southern vantage on DeLuz with a six-man unit.  The Platoon 
Commander deploys in a safe landing zone and sets up communication equipment. 
D-Day H-Hour Event Description 
D+0 H+0 Squad 01 establishes a patrol base north and west of the suspected 
compound.  Squad 02 establishes patrol base south of the 
suspected compound.  Platoon CDR establishes Blue Force 
Tracking (BFT) and performs communication checks with Ground 
Element Commander in the Supporting Arms Coordination Center 
(SACC). 
D+0 H+3 Squads 01 and 02 deploy two unmanned sensors.  One passive 
detection, acoustic sensor and one still video motion capture, 
infrared detector. Unmanned sensor communication checks. 
D+0 H+4 Sensor 2 detection of Red force. 
D+0 H+7 Squad 01 observes truck and foot traffic on adjacent road, 
transmits the contact report to the Platoon Commander. 
D+0 H+8 Squad 01 performs reconnaissance in an area outside the suspected 
compound 
D+0 H+9 Squads 01 and 02 patrol, monitor sensors and resupply.  There are 
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D-Day H-Hour Event Description 
random sensor detections from daily foot and vehicle traffic 
between DeLuz Village, a small port facility and the compound. 
D+0 H+21 Squad 01 patrols an area outside the suspected compound. 
D+0 H+24 The Execute Order is received from the Ground Force Commander 
for an intelligence gathering raid in the suspected compound. 
D+1 H+0 Squads 01 and 02 execute the compound raid. 
D+1 H+4 Squads 01 and 02 proceed to a rally point at the Platoon 
Commanders position and process photos and documents seized.  
This information is transmitted to the Ground Force Commander. 
  Intelligence items gathered consist of photos detailing weapons, 
documents, command and control information, personnel strength 
and the presence of possible non-combatants. 
D+1 H+8 Squads 01 and 02 return to respective patrol areas for patrol, 
monitor sensors, and resupply.  There are random sensor detections 
from daily foot and vehicle traffic between DeLuz Village, the 
small port facility, and the compound. 
  There is increased communications within the ESG in preparation 
for strike planning. 
D+1 H+21 The Execute Order is received from the Ground Force Commander 
for an air strike of the terrorist compound. 
D+2  Squads 01 and 02 observe the compound movement, collect target 
information, and monitor sensors. 
D+3 H-hour A sortie of AV-8 Harriers is ordered for the air strike, Squad 01 
acts as the forward air control for terminal guidance of ordnance. 
D+3 H+1 Squad 01 reports battle damage. 
D+3 H+2 Squads 01 and 02 depart area and proceed to rally point with the 
Platoon Commander, for extraction. 
  A sortie of helicopters is ordered for the Platoon extraction. 
  Squads 01 and 02 are extracted. Helicopters return to the LHA. 
  Mission Complete. 
Table 6. Tactical Scenario Timeline 
 
The ESG repositions within littoral waters of Califate to show defensive and 
humanitarian resolve.  The Task Force initiates an active Maritime Interdiction Operation 
(MIO) within the main shipping lanes. 
The next day, the MEU deploys forces in support of a defensive operation at the 
Califate power plant.  Special Boat Units support the Califate Coast Guard in coastal 
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APPENDIX B. NSS MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The MoEs and their descriptions listed here are not inclusive of all predefined 
MoEs included in the NSS database.  This list includes the IP and broadcast network 
MoEs that are available to evaluate a simulated communication network. 
Messages received records the number of messages received in a user definable time 
interval.  Message types that generate this MoE are triggered by start, failed, update, 
success, cancel events and include, Hard Kill, ID and Track and Trail commands as 
well as contact and track reports. 
 
Messages sent records the number of messages sent in a user definable time interval.  
Message types are the same for messages received MoE. 
 
Contact report receipt delay records the average time from a contact report generation to 
receipt by the destination asset.  Times are averaged over all occurrences within each 
metric reporting interval. 
 
Message receipt delay records the average time from message generation to message 
receipt at a final destination.  Times are averaged over all occurrences within each 
measure user defined reporting interval.  Message types are the same for messages 
received MoE. 
 
Duplicate messages received records the number of duplicate messages received in a user 
defined time interval.  Duplicate messages are only possible in medium resolution 
communications or with unassured communications in low resolution.  Message types 
are the same for messages received MoE. 
 
Terminal relay messages received records the number of times messages are received at a 
terminal relay.  A terminal relay is a recipient that both processes and relays the 
message in question.  This MoE is used primarily with non-source routed vice source 
routed messages.  The communication model design for this study only uses source 
routed messages. 
 
Non-Terminal relay messages received records the number of times the messages are 
received at non-terminal relay nodes.  A non-terminal relay is a recipient that relays, 
but does not process, the messages in question.  This measure applies only to medium 
resolution communications.  Message types are the same for messages received 
MOE. 
 
Contact reports received records the cumulative total number of contact reports, of user 
defined types, generated and received at the time in question.  When multiple 
receiving assets are specified, the contact reports generated by each detected assets 
will be counted once for each contact report receipt at the each of the designated 
receiving assets. 
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Explicit communication load records the level of priority traffic, such as contact and track 
reports, commander tasks and task status, at user specified terminal in kilobytes per 
hour.  This measure is applicable only when medium resolution communications are 
specified for the scenario and IP networks are used in the routed communication plan. 
 
Background communication load records the level of background traffic at selected 
locations in kilobytes per hour.  This measure is also applicable only when medium 
resolution communications are specified for the scenario and IP networks are used in 
the routed communication plan. 
 
Communication message loading records the number of messages passing through user 
specified link terminals.  This measure is also applicable only when medium 
resolution communications are specified for the scenario and IP networks are used in 
the routed communication plan. 
 
Contact report count records the total number of contact and track reports received at 
specified fusion centers during a user defined time period.  This measure can be used 
in conjunction with received contact reports and contact report delay to determine 
precision and timeliness of asset reporting efficiency. 
 
Communication send volume records the communication traffic volume in kilobytes, of 
user specified content sent between selected assets and via specific link terminals.  
This measure is also applicable only when medium resolution communications are 
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